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Platform Inequality: Gender in the Gig-Economy 
Arianne Renan Barzilay & Anat Ben-David† 
Americans are making extra money renting out a spare room, 
designing websites, selling products they design themselves at home, 
or even driving their own car.  This ‘on demand’ or so-called ‘gig 
economy’ is creating exciting opportunities and unleashing 
innovation but it’s also raising hard questions about workplace 
protections and what a good job will look like in the future. 
–Hillary Rodham Clinton1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Laboring in the new economy has recently drawn tremendous social, legal, 
and political debate.  The changes created by platform-facilitated labor are 
considered fundamental challenges to the future of work and are generating 
contestation regarding the proper classification of laborers as employees or 
independent contractors. Yet, despite this growing debate, attention to gender 
dimensions of such laboring is currently lacking. This Article considers the 
gendered promises and challenges that are associated with platform-facilitated 
labor, and provides an innovative empirical analysis of gender discrepancies in 
such labor; it conducts a case study of platform-facilitated labor using 
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 1  Christina Reynolds, Reality Check: Hillary Clinton and the Sharing Economy, 
HILLARYCLINTON.COM, 
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/updates/2015/07/16/reality-check-
sharing-economy (last visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
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computational methods that capture some of the gendered interactions hosted by 
a digital platform. These empirical findings demonstrate that although women 
work for more hours on the platform, women’s average hourly rates are 
significantly lower than men’s, averaging about 2/3 (two-thirds) of men’s rates.  
Such gaps in hourly rates persist even after controlling for feedback score, 
experience, occupational category, hours of work, and educational attainment. 
These findings suggest we are witnessing the remaking of women into devalued 
workers. They point to the new ways in which sex inequality is occurring in 
platform-facilitated labor. They suggest that we are beholding a third generation 
of sex inequality, termed “Discrimination 3.0,” in which discrimination is no 
longer merely a function of formal barriers or even implicit biases.  The Article 
sketches Equality-by-Design (EbD) as a possible direction for future redress, 
through the enlisting of platform technology to enhance gender parity.  In sum, 
this Article provides an empirical base and analysis for understanding the new 
ways sex inequality is taking hold in platform-facilitated labor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Flexibilization, globalization and privatization have presented 
challenges for employment law for some time now.2  Sociologists and 
legal scholars have documented and critiqued the precarious nature 
 
 2  See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Flexibilization, Globalization and Privatization: 
Three Challenges to Labour Rights in Our Time, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 77, 77 (2006) 
(noting that Flexibilization “refers to the changing work practices by which firms no 
longer use internal labour markets or implicitly promise employees lifetime job 
security, but rather seek flexible employment relations that permit them to increase 
or diminish their workforce, and reassign and redeploy employees with ease”).  
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and gendered implications of the work these forces have created.3  We 
know that precarious work—work that departs from the model of a 
full-time, year-round employment relationship with a single 
employer—has historically been conducted mostly by women.4  In the 
past few years, however, precarious work has expanded in magnitude, 
scope, and trendiness for both men and women, professionals and 
non-professionals.5  With the rise of the “sharing” economy, new 
companies are using technology to initiate connections between 
workers offering ad hoc labor and third parties in need of tasks 
performed.6  The “sharing” or “gig” economy is generating widespread 
conversation among academics, lawyers, and policy makers,7 even 
 
 3  Precarious work, characterized by low wages and the absence of job security, is 
associated with part time employment, temp work, on-call work, home working, and 
telecommuting.  KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 69–86 (2004); Judy Fudge & Rosemary 
Owens, Precarious Work, Women, and the New Economy: The Challenge to Legal Norms, in 
PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGES TO LEGAL NORMS 
3, 8, 12–13 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 2006) (noting that this work is 
performed largely by women).  See generally ERIN HATTON, THE TEMP ECONOMY: FROM 
KELLY GIRLS TO PERMATEMPS IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2011) (illustrating how the temp 
industry transformed work in America).  For the effects of economic inequality on 
families, see generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI R. CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW 
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014). 
 4  Fudge & Owens, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that flexible forms of labor, casual 
labor, contract labor and outsourcing are associated primarily with women).  For the 
historical development of women’s labor, see generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO 
WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 30, 36 (2003) (noting 
part time and alternating jobs as historically common for women wage earners).  
 5  See Tamara Kneese et al., Understanding Fair Labor Practices in a Networked Age 
(Data & Soc’y Research Inst. Working Paper, 2014), http://www.datasociety.net/pubs 
/fow/FairLabor.pdf (indicating an increase in part-time, independent, contract, 
freelance modes of labor and noting the “coolness” of individual risk); Orly Lobel, The 
Gig Economy and the Future of Employment and Labor Law, U.S.F. L. REV. 2 (forthcoming), 
[hereinafter Lobel, The Gig Economy], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2848456 (discussing how new digital platform companies are disrupting 
established markets). 
 6  See Matthew W. Finkin, Beclouded Work, Beclouded Workers in Historical Perspective, 
37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 603 (2016) (describing the gig economy, and placing it in 
historical perspective).  See also Megan Carboni, A New Class of Worker for The Sharing 
Economy, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2016).  See generally Kneese et al., supra note 5 (noting 
that technology is central to the sharing economy flexible work patterns that enable 
task-work and that websites connect individuals to customers who want specific tasks 
performed).  
 7  See Thomas E. Perez, Sec’y of Labor, Remarks at the Department of Labor 
Future of Work Symposium (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/ 
speech/20151210.  See also Kneese et al., supra note 5; Benjamin Sachs, Uber: Employee 
Status and “Flexibility”, ON LABOR (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https://onlabor.org/2015/09/25/uber-employee-status-and-flexibility; Noah Zatz, Is 
Uber Wagging the Dog With Its Moonlighting Drivers?, ON LABOR (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://onlabor.org/2016/02/01/is-uber-wagging-the-dog-with-its-moonlighting-
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permeating the recent presidential race,8 and is likely to growingly 
preoccupy law and policy in coming years.  While there is no clear 
definition of this economy, for our purposes, the Article will 
characterize it by the disaggregation of consumption and the 
segmentation of production via online platforms.9  Indeed, 
fragmented, loose, informal, task-based forms of labor have been 
amplified worldwide.  We now see micro-labor on a macro scale—so 
much so that some have claimed we are witnessing a “paradigmatic 
shift” in the way we work.10 
“Sharing” economy companies, at first benignly dubbed “peer to 
peer” and marketed as fresh, innovative, and “collaborative,”11 have 
mushroomed in popularity and scale.  The “sharing” economy now 
provides a wide and ever-broadening range of services, from driving, 
to running errands, to professional tasks.12  While “sharing” economy 
firms vary somewhat in the amount of control they exert over laborers, 
their specific discursive terminology of laborers,13 the platforms they 
provide, and the fees they collect, they all: (a) use the Internet; and 
(b) endorse the ability of laborers to earn money, often from the 
vicinity of one’s home and, importantly, on one’s own schedule.  These 
companies are increasingly criticized for ushering in with full force an 
“on-demand,” “on-call,” “gig”–based economy, and for selling us uber-
capitalism under the guise of sharing rhetoric.14 
 
drivers. 
 8  See Reynolds, supra note 1. 
 9  See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government Policy: 
The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy” 8 (George Mason Univ. L. & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, No. 15-01, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2549919 (explaining the disaggregation of consumption).  For general 
fissured trends of employment, see also DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY 
WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014). 
 10  See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016).  See also Mary 
L. Gray, Your Job Is About to Get ‘Taskified’, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016, 6:52 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0110-digital-turk-work-20160110-
story.html (instead of hiring employees, firms can now post tasks on the web thus 
fragmenting jobs; such “online piecework” represents a “radical shift in how we define 
employment itself”). 
 11  RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO RODGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF 
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION xiv–xv (2010).  
 12  Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risaktt, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers? 
Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619, 622 (2016).  
 13  For example, Uber calls its laborers drivers, “partners,” and “independent 
contractors.”  See Partners, UBER.COM, https://partners.uber.com/join (last visited July 
23, 2016).  Taskrabbit calls its laborers “taskers.”  See TASKRABBIT, 
https://www.taskrabbit.com (last visited July 23, 2016).   
 14  See, e.g., TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 
(2015). 
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Technological advances and changes in social and economic 
organization often present moments of opportunity and challenge.15  
Newly technologized contingent work practices are already creating 
tremendous social change.16  Increasingly, such work practices are 
remapping the frontier between home and work, public and private, 
employment and contracting.17  They are also testing the boundaries 
of legal responsibility.18  Employment law scholarship has begun to pay 
attention to this phenomenon, focusing primarily on whether taskers 
should be classified as employees or independent contractors.19  Still, 
little is known about the gender dimensions of platform-facilitated 
labor.20  We should start filling in this void and thinking through the 
gendered implications and legal ramifications of laboring in the new, 
“sharing” economy.  This Article begins that process. 
Part I considers the gendered promises and challenges associated 
with platform-facilitated labor.  On its face, platform-facilitated labor 
has potential to enhance gender equality because laborers may 
sometimes enjoy a degree of anonymity and inclusiveness when 
offering work via platform, and a substantial degree of flexibility which 
 
 15  See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 2 (2006). 
 16  Lobel, The Gig Economy, supra note 5, at 3. 
 17  See id. at 3–7; Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, FORDHAM 
URBAN L.J. 1, 5 (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2865710. 
 18  See, e.g., Order-Denying-Plaintiffs-Motion-for-Preliminary Approval of Settlement, 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT CT., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/EMC/OConnorvUber 
Technologies (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) (Uber argues that because it sets minimal 
controls over drivers’ hours, they are not Uber employees, thus testing the boundaries 
of its legal responsibilities). 
 19  See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment 
in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1637 (2016); Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the 
“Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowd Work and Labor Protection in the “Gig-
Economy”, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 471 (2016); Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or 
Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker Identities, 105 CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2796728; 
Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1511, 1511 (2016); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting 
Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 479 (2016). Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs 
of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015).  See also Guy Davidov, The Status of Uber 
Drivers, ON LABOR (May 17, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/05/17/guest-post-the-
status-of-uber-drivers-part-1-some-preliminary-questions; Sachs, supra note 7 
(considering whether flexibility enjoyed by workers can determine employee or 
independent contractor status). 
 20  See Schoenbaum, supra note 17.  Schoenbaum has claimed that the 
pervasiveness of intimacy in services such as those provided through Uber and Airbnb 
may prime sex stereotypes.  On race and the sharing economy, see generally Nancy 
Leong, New Economy, Old Biases, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2153, 2153 (2016). 
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may be helpful for those with gendered familial responsibilities.21  On 
the other hand, such work may actually be hindering laborers, since it 
requires far less investment in workers, and offers fewer opportunities 
for workers to establish close relationships with work-providers.  
Moreover, at present such work provides a paucity of benefits for 
laborers, and a dearth of protections against discrimination. 
While the promises and challenges posed to gender equality by 
this form of labor are considerable, there is an acute shortage of data 
analyzing online platform work from a gender perspective.  Part II 
empirically examines how women are doing in this growing economy.  
Through an empirical case-study focusing on workers on one global 
platform (“the Platform”), it examines gender discrepancies in 
platform-facilitated online labor.  The Article employs a computational 
approach that automatically extracts profile data from the Platform’s 
Application Programming Interface (API).22  Rather than relying on 
answers or data reported by users through surveys, extracting data 
directly from the Platform’s API enables us to capture a snapshot of 
the actual user profiles that are in use on the Platform.  The 
application of computational, unobtrusive methods is tailored to 
capture the unique digital aspects of the “gig” economy by providing a 
snapshot of the actual digital interactions that the Platform hosts, as 
they are shaped by its technological affordances, and as they are made 
available through the Platform’s API.  The study analyzes over 4,600 
online taskers’ requested rates, occupations, and work-hours.  Using 
statistical analysis, its findings illustrate a dramatic gender gap in the 
hourly rate requested by men and women who are seeking work 
through the studied platform.  The findings show women’s average 
hourly requested rates are 37% lower than men’s.  Such gaps in hourly 
requested rates persist even after controlling for feedback score, 
experience, occupational category, hours of work, and educational 
attainment.  Surprisingly, among the different occupational categories 
available on the Platform, the most pervasive gender gaps were found 
with regard to those offering legal services. 
 
 21  Lack of anonymity has been suggested to prime sex stereotypes, see 
Schoenbaum, supra note 17.  Flexibility may prove helpful for those with caring 
responsibilities.  JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 84–86(2000).  Family care still tends to be 
gendered.  See Naomi R. Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 188 
(2000). 
 22  Permission to extract the data was obtained through the Platform.  See E-mail 
from API Support Team, to Adam Amram (Mar. 3, 2016, 9:25 AM) (on file with 
authors).  For more on the data collection and for the benefits and limitations of this 
kind of methodological approach, see infra Part II. 
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Given these dramatic empirical findings, Part III begins to 
consider the legal implications for working in platform-facilitated 
online labor.  It argues that to realize the promises of platform-
facilitated labor for gender equality we must: (a) make such labor a 
sustainable work option for those heavily involved; and (b) mitigate 
the perils faced disproportionately by women.  It posits the ineptitude 
of current legal norms to do both.  Part IV suggests that we are 
witnessing a third generation of sex-inequality, which we term 
“Discrimination 3.0” in which sex discrimination may be occurring on 
platforms, and in which platforms may (likely unconsciously) be 
harboring gender inequality.  It illuminates challenges that platform 
inequality poses for antidiscrimination law more generally, and calls 
for contemplating new mechanisms for promoting work equality.  It 
suggests that we could use platform technology itself to promote 
Equality-By-Design (EbD) as a mechanism towards enhancing gender 
parity in platform-facilitated labor. 
I. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF BALKANIZED LABOR 
The “sharing” economy has been celebrated as a job creator, a 
liberating option for those unable to attain stable employment, and as 
providing freedom and flexibility.23  By some estimates, more than 22% 
of U.S. adults (approximately 45 million people) have already offered 
their labor and services in the “sharing” economy,24 with numbers likely 
to grow.25  This Part outlines promises and pitfalls associated with this 
 
 23  See Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and 
Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/ 
technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty. 
html.  See also Paul Merrion & Fareeha Ali, Making Inroads: Women Cabbies on the Rise, 
CHI. BUS. (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140927/ISSU 
E01/309279976/making-inroads-women-cabbies-on-the-rise.  
 24  Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME (Jan. 6, 
2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll.  But other estimates found 
that only 4 percent of the adult population had ever participated in the online 
platform economy.  Paychecks, Paydays, and the Online Platform Economy: Big Data on 
Income Volatility, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 8–9, 21 (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-
volatility-2-report.pdf.  Other research suggests workers on online-platforms comprise 
a small but rapidly growing share of the economy.  Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, 
The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015, 
SCHOLARS AT HARVARD (2016), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/lkatz/files/katz_ 
krueger_cws_v3.pdf.  See also The Online Platform Economy: What is the growth trajectory?, 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/ 
corporate/institute/insight-online-platform-econ-growth-trajectory.htm.  
 25  See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-
to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 116 (2015). 
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new form of labor for women’s economic equality and security. 
On the one hand, the new online, free-access “sharing” economy 
form of laboring shows great promise for enhancing women’s 
economic equality through participation in the online workforce for 
two main reasons.  The first is that, at least in some cases, laborers enjoy 
a greater degree of anonymity and potential inclusiveness when 
offering services online, which could offset bias, barriers, and 
discrimination still faced by women in the general workforce.  This may 
be especially true if anonymity and gender-blindness are preserved in 
online platforms, which is often not the case; but it may potentially also 
be the case if anonymity is not preserved, given the gender 
discrepancies in pay, promotion, and opportunities the workplace has 
long exerted.26  Given that some “sharing” economy work is based 
online rather than in-person, and is horizontal rather than hierarchal, 
women may also find it easier to negotiate for equal pay.  After all, the 
income generated by the same online task should not be affected by 
the laborer’s gender. 
The second reason for optimism is that in most cases, laborers in 
the “sharing” economy enjoy a substantial degree of flexibility in 
setting their work schedules.27  That flexibility is especially important 
 
 26  For the persistent existence of the wage gap, see generally Fact Sheet: The Wage 
Gap Is Stagnant in the Last Decade, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/wage_gap_is_stagnant_2013_2.pdf.  
The National Women’s Law Center data is only on full–time earners.  The wage gap is 
even more severe for the many women who are relegated to part-time, temporary, 
contingent work.  See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, UNITED 
STATES DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2014/cpsaat37.htm (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2017)  (revealing that women’s median wages for full-time, year-round work 
were 82% of their male counterparts’); BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2008, at 1–2 (2009), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-
earnings/archive/womensearnings_2008.pdf (showing occupational segregation and 
generally lower earnings for women than men); On Pay Gap, Millennial Women Near 
Parity—For Now, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/11/on-pay-gap-millennial-women-near-
parity-for-now (showing young women are making progress and starting their working 
lives earning nearly the same as young men).  See also DEBORAH L. RHODE, WHAT 
WOMEN WANT: AN AGENDA FOR THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 7, 25–38 (2014) (discussing a 
persistent gender gap in leadership); Christianne Corbett & Catherine Hill, Graduating 
to a Pay Gap: The Earnings of Women and Men One Year after College Graduation, AM. ASS’N 
OF UNIV. WOMEN (Oct. 2012), http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/graduating-to-a-
pay-gap-the-earnings-of-women-and-men-one-year-after-college-graduation.pdf 
(reporting that women earn less than men already one year after graduation, across 
different occupations).  See generally MARIA CHARLES & DAVID GRUSKY, OCCUPATIONAL 
GHETTOS: THE WORLDWIDE SEGREGATION OF WOMEN AND MEN (2004) (reporting that 
men and women still work in significantly segregated occupations). 
 27  Carboni, supra note 6; Drive with Uber: Earn money on your schedule, UBER, 
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for working caregivers, who are still predominately women.28  Indeed, 
it seems like “sharing” economy companies are aiming to attract 
women using precisely these rationales: these companies market 
themselves as empowering women by providing them with the 
flexibility they need to balance work with family and other gendered 
responsibilities.29  Work and family both carry great significance in 
most people’s lives, so providing shorter work hours and flexible 
schedules for both men and women may potentially prove beneficial 
in the search for work-family balance.30  On its face, then, the 
mushrooming of the “sharing” economy might be seen as a positive 
force for women’s empowerment and equality.  After all, the idea is 
that in the “sharing” economy a person is the designer of her labor.  
With no boss to tell her when to work, or which assignments to take 
on, she is the architect of her work life.  Additionally, the flexibility of 
the “sharing” economy offers to both men and women the promise of 
gainful employment alongside family-care, potentially even changing 
the normalized gendered roles of caretaking and breadwinning.31 
However, the view of cyberspace as an ideal realm where all can 
participate equally, free from historical, social, and physical restraints 
has already been critiqued as utopian.32  The picture does indeed look 
 
https://get.uber.com/drive/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
 28  See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace 
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1195, 1235 (1989); Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting 
Title VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
55, 100 (2016). 
 29  For example, Uber has stated:  
[F]reedom is helping (literally) drive another wave of women’s 
empowerment: the opportunity to fit work around life, rather than the 
other way around.  Around 20 million Americans work fewer hours than 
they would like for “non-economic reasons,” according to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  These include personal commitments, in particular 
child care, that can make full-time jobs so difficult. . . . It’s one of the 
reasons Uber last year announced a commitment to get one million 
women drivers using our app by 2020.  Because driving a car isn’t just a 
way to get to work—it can be the work.  For women around the world, 
Uber offers something unique: work on demand, whenever you want it.  
Drivers can make money on their own terms and set their own schedules. 
Blaire Mattson, This International Women’s Day, Women Take the Wheel, UBER NEWSROOM 
(Mar. 7, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/driven-women. 
 30  See Arianne Renan Barzilay, Back to the Future: Introducing Constructive Feminism 
for the Twenty-First Century—A New Paradigm for the Family and Medical Leave Act, 6 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 407, 432–35 (2012).  
 31  See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE, WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER 2 (2010) (discussing how workplace norms pressure men into breadwinning 
roles and women out of them).  For the gendered roles of caretaking and 
breadwinning, see Cahn, supra note 21, at 188, 191, 200–01, 214. 
 32  See Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 
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far more complicated, in the context of platform-facilitated, on-
demand labor.  Companies like Uber treat drivers as contractors rather 
than employers, thereby avoiding worker protections such as overtime, 
minimum wage, family leave, and unemployment insurance.33  Of 
course, freelancing, temp work, and telecommuting have been around 
for a long time, but the “sharing” economy’s rapid growth in recent 
years has given rise to a growing online service economy that applies 
the contract-worker model across various sectors.  This trend has a 
dramatic influence on the workforce and the organization of 
employment, as the volume, ease, and scope of online precarious labor 
is increasing.34  According to some evaluations, by 2020, 40% of 
American workers will be working as independent contractors,35 likely 
making platform-facilitated labor even more popular.  These so-called 
contracting, freelancing, or “tasking” work models require far less 
investment in workers, offer fewer opportunities for workers to 
establish relationships with employers, and provide fewer benefits and 
a paucity of protections against discrimination than do long-term or 
full-time employment models.36  Additionally, the sheer number of 
online taskers competing for a given task may encourage the lowering 
of bidding rates.37  Along with information gaps about the actual work 
a given task entails, the pressure to lower one’s price may generate 
exploitative work practices.38 
 
20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 225 (2011).  
 33  Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating Employment Relationships in The Sharing Economy, 
20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 2 (2016) (noting that sharing economy work often 
entails no benefits).  See Finkin, supra note 6, at 611, 615 (explaining that when workers 
are not considered “employees” the purchaser of their labor need not bear benefits 
such as minimum wage, or family leave); see also Carboni, supra note 6; Henry Ross, 
Ridesharing’s House of Cards: O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and The Viability of 
Uber’s Labor Model in Washington, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2015). 
 34  See Lobel, supra note 10, at 1; The Online Platform Economy: What is the growth 
trajectory?, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (Feb. 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/ 
corporate/institute/insight-online-platform-econ-growth-trajectory.htm. 
 35  Joanna Penn & John Wihbey, Uber, Airbnb and Consequences of the Sharing Economy: 
Research Roundup, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE, http://journalistsresource.org/studies/ 
economics/business/airbnb-lyft-uber-bike-share-sharing-economy-research-
roundup#sthash.XMg2yvqU.dpuf (last updated June 3, 2016).  See also Cunningham-
Parmeter, supra note 19, at 4 (citing INTUIT, INTUIT 2020 REPORT: TWENTY TRENDS THAT 
WILL SHAPE THE NEXT DECADE 20 (2010)). 
 36  See Vicki Schultz, Feminism and Workplace Flexibility, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1203 (2010); 
Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283 
(2003). 
 37  See Finkin, supra note 6, at 617 (explaining how global competition may erode 
wages). 
 38  Brad Stone, My Life as a Taskrabbit: A Short Career in the Distributed Workforce, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-
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One can argue that these work practices are actually preventing 
economic sustainability and equality for women, and that the “sharing” 
economy, far from helping laborers overcome the work-family conflict, 
may be worsening it by reducing the human subject to a mere 
commodity.  Because detached and fragmented labor places the ideal 
of stable employment and self-sufficiency beyond the reach of many 
laborers, thereby requiring them to work for more hours to make ends 
meet, it may create numerous risks for workers and families.39  This 
form of labor may carry additional specific, gendered risks for 
caregivers.  For example, arranging, scheduling, and providing 
childcare when one is an on-call worker makes juggling work and 
family even more difficult to sustain.40  Furthermore, some have 
claimed that the “sharing” economy heightens the salience of sex 
(because of the intimacy associated with some transactions and the 
accessibility to photographs and names online), which primes sex-
stereotypes, often considered harmful for gender equality.41 
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Given the considerable theoretical benefits and challenges 
illustrated above, it is especially important to begin to empirically 
examine how women are actually faring in the online “sharing” 
economy.  Women comprise a substantial share of “sharing” economy 
laborers.42  Women still do the lion’s share of familial caregiving, while 
most lucrative jobs are constructed for workers free from such 
responsibilities.43  The attraction of flexible schedules, combined with 
women’s second-class status in the workplace generally,44 may make 
women especially susceptible to the lure of fragmented tasking 
services.45  But to what degree are these new forms of work reorganizing 
 
13/my-life-as-a-taskrabbit.  For a more optimistic assessment of working in the sharing 
economy, see Lobel, supra note 10. 
 39  See Carboni, supra note 6. 
 40  See Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951 (2011).  See 
Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the Law: Three Approaches, 72 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 44–51 (2009) (stating that the gender divide is fundamental to 
economic production). 
 41  Schoenbaum, supra note 17. 
 42  Katz & Krueger, supra note 24, at 11–12 (observing a “notable rise in the share 
of workers in alternative work arrangements that are women”).  See also Steinmetz, 
supra note 24. 
 43 See WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 14–19. 
 44  Abrams, supra note 28, at 1191, 1196 (noting that women have been 
disadvantaged as workers by the fact that central features of the workplace have been 
constructed by and for men).  See supra note 26. 
 45  See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s 
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around the same gendered lines?  Are the new platforms enhancing 
women’s opportunities in important and substantial ways, or are they 
merely replicating “old” economy gender inequality? 
Social science data has long pointed to the persistent existence of 
a wage and leadership gap and of occupational segregation in the 
workplace.46  The Internet has been critiqued as a place in which sexual 
harassment has dramatic discriminatory effect on women, and in 
which women have had to silence their potentially rewarding online 
presences due to cyber harassment.47  Some attention has recently been 
paid to the “sharing” economy’s possible effects on underprivileged 
groups like racial minorities,48 and new research has shown that blacks 
are discriminated against on Airbnb.49  Some have found that customer 
satisfaction ratings (important tools for users on various platforms) 
overwhelmingly favored men over women.50  Women have been found 
to receive less money than men when selling the same merchandise on 
eBay.51  But how is gender playing out in the unregulated online 
“sharing” economy labor context?  Do women still earn less than men, 
even online?  Are the age-old maladies confronted by women in the 
“old” economy morphed through technology in the new one? 
There is an acute shortage of data analyzing online platform work 
from a gender perspective.  We investigate a global online platform 
that connects work-seekers of various occupations with online tasks to 
be performed.  We use data from the studied platform as a case study 
through which to examine gendered dimensions of work in the “gig” 
economy.  On the studied platform, people can register either as work-
seekers or as potential work-providers.  Work-seekers create profiles in 
which they provide information about the services they perform, their 
 
Cultural Caregiving and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 371 (2001) (arguing that a lack of parental leave policies creates an 
“attachment gap” for women in the workforce). 
 46  See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 47  Franks, supra note 32. 
 48  Nancy Leong, The Sharing Economy Has a Race Problem, SALON (Nov. 2, 2014), 
http://www.salon.com/2014/11/02/the_sharing_economy_has_a_race_problem. 
 49  Benjamin G. Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of 
Airbnb.com (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377353; Benjamin Edelman, 
Michal Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence From a 
Field Experiment (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-069, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2701902. 
 50  Larry Kim, Gender Bias in Online Marketing: Data Shows Women Are Undervalued by 
21%, WORDSTREAM (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2014/05/ 
13/gender-bias. 
 51  Tamar Kricheli-Katz & Tali Regev, How Many Cents on the Dollar? Women and Men 
in Product Markets, 2 SCI. ADVANCES 1 (2016). 
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skills, and their requested “hourly rate.”52  There is no box to check on 
the profile page for the gender of work-seekers, but names are 
required and photographs are commonly used as profile pictures.53  
Potential work-providers post jobs to which work-seekers apply.  After 
the potential work-provider reviews the profiles of those who have 
applied, they may contact those who seem the most fitting to complete 
the online task.54  After an interview, which usually takes place outside 
of the Platform (such as via email or phone), the work-provider sends 
an offer to the work-seeker and when the work-seeker accepts the 
terms, a contract is signed.55  After the task is completed, the Platform 
transfers pay via an escrow account.  The work-provider then rates the 
performance of the work-seeker, which appears on her profile as a 
“feedback score.”56  The Platform collects its fee as a percentage of 
every transaction.57 
A. Method 
Traditionally, studies on the gender pay gap primarily rely on data 
obtained from surveys, coupled with demographic data.58  By contrast, 
in this study we undertake a computational approach to measuring 
gendered dimensions of working on the Platform by extracting profile 
data from its Application Programming Interface (API).  Rather than 
relying on surveys or questionnaires that are based on answers or data 
reported by users, extracting the data from the Platform’s API enables 
us to capture a snapshot of the actual user profiles that are in use on 
the Platform.  Since we aim to examine the gendered dimensions of 
working via an online platform, and because the “gig” economy is 
operating through platforms, the application of computational, 
unobtrusive methods is tailored to capture the unique digital aspects 
of the “gig” economy, by providing a snapshot of the actual digital 
interactions that the Platform hosts, as they are shaped by its 
technological affordances,59 and as they are made available through 
 
 52  This information appears on the Platform’s website (link on file with authors).  
 53  Id.  
 54  Id.  
 55  Id.  
 56  Id.  
 57  Id.  
 58  See supra note 26. 
 59  The term “technological affordances” relates to the ways with which technology 
shapes sociability.  It examines the ways humans (users), perceive objects as 
possibilities for potential actions and act upon them.  The term is widely used by 
scholars of social media platforms.  See, e.g., Ester Weltevrede & Erik Borra, Platform 
Affordances and Data Practices: The Value of Dispute on Wikipedia, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1 
(2016). 
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the Platform’s API.60 
As a first step, we collected data.  After gaining permission from 
the Platform to access their API, we built a python script to 
automatically extract a sample of users’ profile data according to the 
following parameters: 1) profiles from the U.S.; 2) profiles of private 
people (as opposed to agencies that provide services through its 
workers); and 3) profiles that were active on the Platform between 
June 2015 and March 2016.  In total, we retrieved 24,000 user profiles 
within these dimensions. 
Subsequently, we set to obtain a pool of gender identifiable 
profiles.  While the Platform does not provide a specified field for 
gender in the user profile, the gender of a user is known to people or 
companies who provide work opportunities either through the user’s 
name, or through their profile picture.  Therefore, in order to 
automatically determine the gender of the extracted profiles, we used 
two web services: 
a. Genderize.io, a web service aimed at identifying gender based 
on English names.61 
b. Angus.ai, a web service aimed at identifying gender based on 
photos.62 
To validate the automated gender identification of the extracted 
profiles, we only selected profiles in which both services indicated an 
80% or more certainty about the gender, and additionally, we 
compared the findings of each service with the other, and only took 
profiles that both services identified as the same gender.  After 
comparing both services, we remained with profiles whose average 
gender accuracy was 98% for name identification and 96% for photos.  
After this, 4,669 profiles remained. 
From the extracted profile data, we further selected fields for 
analysis according to fields articulated by the Platform’s API: 1) 
Occupational Category (“Accounting & Consulting,” “Admin 
Support,” “Customer Service,” “Data Science & Analytics,” “Design & 
Creative,” “Engineering & Architecture,” “IT & Networking,” “Legal,” 
“Sales & Marketing,” “Translation,” “Web, Mobile & Software 
Development,” “Writing”); 2) “Hourly Rate” – the hourly pay rate 
determined by the work-seeker; 3) “Feedback Score” – a score on a 
scale of one to five given to the user by those who utilized the user’s 
 
 60  See Christine Hine, Internet Research and Unobtrusive Methods, 61 SOC. RES. UPDATE 
1 (2011) (presenting the benefits of such an approach). 
 61  See Determine the Gender of a First Name, GENDERIZE.IO, https://genderize.io/ (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2016).  
 62  See ANGUS.AI, https://www.angus.ai/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2016). 
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labor after completing a task through the Platform: this field shows the 
average feedback score a user received from previous assignments; and 
4) “Total Hours” – the accumulative number of hours a user worked 
through the Platform.  Note that in our dataset the total number of 
hours does not include tasks billed with a fixed price, but only those 
with an hourly rate. 
To further enrich the analysis, we computed two additional fields 
based on the data extracted from the API.  The first is years of 
experience.  From the profiles’ self-description field, we automatically 
extracted the description of previous work, and calculated years of 
experience as a subtraction of the first year from the last year worked 
in each previous job.  We added the number of years worked in each 
previous work to calculate an estimate of the user’s work experience in 
years.  Parallel jobs conducted in the same year were excluded from 
the calculation of this field, so as not to skew the data. 
The second computed field is the level of education attainment.  
The education field returned by the Platform’s API contains all 
degrees mentioned by a given profile.  To determine a profile’s level 
of education, we manually selected the highest degree mentioned, and 
kept it in a separate field we called “degree.”  Subsequently, we 
clustered the different degrees into the following categories of level of 
education attainment: high school, associate degrees, bachelor 
degrees (undergraduate), master’s degrees (graduate), and doctorate 
degrees (including J.D.).  Since the extraction of the highest degree 
was performed manually, the field of level of education attainment was 
computed only on the occupational category “Legal.” 
Finally, we used descriptive statistics and regression models to 
analyze the data.  Specifically, we computed the differences in the 
average hourly rate of women and men across all occupational 
categories, and used a standard t-test to compare mean differences by 
gender within occupational category.  After confirming that there are 
significant interactions between occupational categories and the 
hourly rate, we subsequently conducted a two-way analysis of variance 
(“ANOVA”) with the log of the hourly rate in order to assess the effect 
of gender on the hourly pay in each occupational category.  We then 
repeated the model, each time testing for possible interactions with 
the following variables: “feedback score,” “years of experience,” and 
“total hours” worked on the Platform.  Finally, we used a linear 
regression model on the log of the hourly rate to compute the ratio in 
the hourly rate of women and men in each occupational category, as 
well as for all categories taken together. 
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B. Findings 
Our findings show a dramatic gender gap in platform-facilitated 
online work, on the Platform.  They show that although the overall 
number of male and female profiles in the dataset is equally 
distributed (N = 2321 women, 2348 men), and so is the average 
feedback score of male and female profiles (3.21 for women, 3.17 for 
men), women have worked a larger total number of hours (N = 
773,666) than men (N = 611,912).  However, on average, women’s 
hourly rate is 37% lower than men’s: the overall average hourly rate 
for women is $28.20 per hour, compared to an average hourly rate of 
$45.07 for men.  It should be noted that the proportion between 
female and male profiles varies across the different occupational 
categories (see Figure 1), and so does the gap in the hourly rate of men 
and women in each category (see Figure 2).  Half of the occupational 
categories (N=6) are populated by more women than men, namely, 
Customer Service (77% women), Admin & Support (73% women), 
Legal (70% women), Translation (65% women), Writing (65% 
women), and Sales & Marketing (62% women).  Three categories have 
more male profiles: Engineering & Architecture (83% men), IT & 
Networking (82% men), and Data Science & Analytics (73% men).  In 
the remaining categories (N = 3) male and female profiles are more or 
less equally distributed: Accounting & Consulting (54% women), Web, 
Mobile & Software Development (49% women), and Design & 
Creative (44.1% women). 
 
  
Figure 1. The number of male and female profiles in each occupational category. 
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Figure 2. Average hourly rate by occupational category and gender. 
 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the average hourly rate per 
occupational category.  Since the distribution of the average hourly 
rate was not normal, we conducted a t-test to compare differences on 
the log of the average hourly rate of men and women.  We report that 
the hourly rate gap exists in all categories, albeit with significant 
differences between categories.  For example, “Legal” stands out as the 
occupational category where the average hourly rate of women makes 
only 37% of men’s 100%.  At the other extreme, women’s profiles in 
the “Design & Creative” category have an average hourly rate that is 
almost equal to that of men (95%).  A significant hourly rate gap is 
reported for categories with a majority of female profiles.  In the 
categories “Accounting & Consulting” and “Customer Service,” for 
example, the average hourly rate of women is only 62% and 64%, 
respectively, of the average hourly rate of men.  Although in the 
categories “Translation” and “Writing,” where there is also a majority 
of female profiles, the reported average hourly rate gap is narrower 
(79% and 83%, respectively), the differences between the average log 
of the hourly rate of men and women in these categories have not been 
found statistically significant (see Table 1).  In categories with a 
majority of men’s profiles, the hourly rate gap varies from 65% in “IT 
& Networking” to 80% in “Data Science & Analytics.” 
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Table 1. T-test on Log of Hourly rate 
 
  Hourly rate 
T-test  
on the log 
of Hourly 
rate 
Category Gender N Mean Std 
Female 
compared 
to Male 
Significance 
Accounting & 
Consulting  
female 204 36.52 46.05 
-38% 
 
  male 186 58.96 55.34
Admin Support  female 278 23.86 14.99 -32%  
  male 84 35.03 25.79
Customer Service  female 273 17.26 10.03 -36%  
  male 101 26.97 27.55
Data Science & 
Analytics  
female 121 36.65 40.33 
-20% 
 
  male 318 45.83 34.66
Design & Creative  female 162 33.50 24.87 -5%
  male 205 35.13 23.53
Engineering & 
Architecture 
female 60 26.45 15.69 
-36% 
 
  male 289 41.31 26.08
IT & Networking  female 64 32.72 24.60 -35%  
  male 281 50.01 40.61
Legal  female 302 28.88 31.86 -63%  
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  male 129 77.93 71.04
Sales & Marketing  female 213 32.50 22.44 -32%  
  male 195 48.10 36.69
Translation  female 292 22.57 13.78 -17%
  male 155 27.03 22.06
Web, Mobile & 
Software Dev 
female 98 35.41 19.45 
-25% 
 
  male 270 47.38 37.67
Writing  female 254 29.13 21.15 -21%
  male 135 37.10 35.27
ALL  female 2321 28.20 26.01 -37%  
  male 2348 45.07 39.65
 P<.05 P<.01 P<.001 
 
In order to verify that the differences in the hourly rate of 
women and men are not a result of other factors, several alternative 
explanations were tested.  Specifically, we attempted to rule out that 
the occupational category itself, the years of experience worked 
outside of the Platform, the feedback score or the total hours worked 
on the Platform are the variables that account for most of the 
differences found in the hourly rate of women and men.  A two-way 
analysis of variance (“ANOVA”) model shows that the interaction 
between gender and the occupational category has a significant effect 
(F = 40.19, p < 0.001, R-square = 0.165).  See Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Two-way ANOVA on the log of the hourly rate 
 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares
Mean 
Square
F 
Value 
Pr > F 
Model 23 400.133947 17.397128 40.19 <.0001 
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Source DF Sum of 
Squares
Mean 
Square
F 
Value 
Pr > F 
Error 4645 2010.480699 0.432827     
Corrected 
Total 
4668 2410.614646     
 
R-Square Coeff Var Root MSE log hourly rate mean
0.165988 19.79749 0.657896 3.323126
 
Source DF Type III SS Mean 
Square
F 
Value 
Pr > F 
Category 11 165.7583917 15.0689447 34.82 <.0001 
Gender 1 94.0194458 94.0194458 217.22 <.0001 
Category*Gender 11 41.2556977 3.7505180 8.67 <.0001 
 
Furthermore, gender remained a significant predictor of the 
hourly rate when each of the other independent variants (years of 
experience, feedback score, hours of work) was added to the model.  
For example, there is a significant interaction between years of 
experience and the log of the hourly rate.  However when the variant 
years of experience was added to the model together with gender and 
occupational category, the interaction between gender and the log of 
the hourly rate remained significant (F = 39.20, p < 0.001, R-square = 
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0.19).  A two-way multivariate analysis of variance (“MANOVA”) model, 
comparing gender, occupational category, feedback score, years of 
experience and the total hours worked on the Platform resulted in a 
significant multivariate effect (F = 19.64, p < 0.001, R-square = 0.18).63  
See Table 3.  This confirms that the alternative explanations to the 
differences found in the hourly rate of women and men do not rule 
out the significant effect of gender. 
 
Table 3. Two-way MANOVA on the log of the hourly rate. 
 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares
Mean 
Square
F 
Value 
Pr > F 
Model 26 187.924453 7.227864 19.64 <.0001 
Error 2249 827.657393 0.368011    
Corrected 
Total 
2275 1015.581846     
 
R-Square Coeff Var Root MSE log hourly rate mean
0.185041 17.97336 0.606639 3.375214
 
 
 63  Note that the variant “Total hours” was computed on values that are larger than 
zero, therefore only relating to people who have already completed hourly work on 
the Platform (N = 2275). 
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Source DF Type III SS Mean 
Square
F 
Value 
Pr > F 
Category 11 39.98418673 3.63492607 9.88 <.0001 
Gender 1 61.79873027 61.79873027 167.93 <.0001 
Category*Gender 11 13.83327945 1.25757086 3.42 0.0001 
Feedback Score 1 5.00322945 5.00322945 13.60 0.0002 
Experience  1 12.77920923 12.77920923 34.73 <.0001 
Total Hours 1 1.32609520 1.32609520 3.60 0.0578 
Since we found significant interaction between the 
occupational category and the hourly rate, and after confirming that 
the profiles in each category are unique, we further conducted 
separate regression analyses on the effect of gender on the hourly rate 
for each of the twelve occupational categories, as well as for all 
categories taken together.  As can be seen in Table 4, with the 
exception of the categories “Design & Creative,” “Translation” and 
“Writing,” we found a significant effect of gender on the hourly rate.  
We subsequently converted the difference in the log values of the 
hourly rate of women and men into a ratio of women’s hourly rate out 
of men’s.  We can therefore confirm that in nine out of the twelve 
occupational categories there are statistically significant gaps in the 
hourly rate of women compared to men.  For example, in the 
“Customer Service” category, women’s hourly rate is 73% of what their 
male peers requested.  In the “Legal” category, women’s hourly rate is 
as low as 44% of the hourly rate asked by men.  Finally, we report that 
after controlling for the separate effect of gender on the hourly rate in 
each of the occupational categories, when all occupational categories 
are taken together, women’s hourly rates are only 66% of what men 
request.  This figure corresponds with the 37% gap reported for the 
differences in the average hourly pay for men and women at the outset 
of the findings section. 
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Table 4. Regression analysis of gender on the log of the hourly rate 
 
Category N 
Regression 
coefficient 
of female vs. 
male 
(on log of 
Hourly rate) Significance 
Female/
male 
ratio (on 
Hourly 
rate) 
Accounting & 
Consulting 
390 -0.4752  0.62 
Admin Support 362 -0.3122  0.73 
Customer Service 374 -0.2893  0.75 
Data Science & 
Analytics 
439 -0.2826  0.75 
Design & 
Creative 
367 -0.0516 NS 0.95 
Engineering & 
Architecture 
349 -0.4107  0.66 
IT & Networking 345 -0.3947  0.67 
Legal 431 -0.8261  0.44 
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Sales & 
Marketing 
408 -0.3436  0.71 
Translation 447 -0.1086 NS 0.90 
Web, Mobile & 
Software 
Development 
368 -0.2112  0.81 
Writing 389 -0.1378 NS 0.87 
ALL 
466
9 
-0.4109  0.66 
We have seen that the category “Legal” somewhat deviates from 
the other categories under examination, since it displays the largest 
gap between the average hourly rate of men and women, but our t-test 
on the log of the average hourly rate of men and women was not 
statistically significant.  In order to further understand the outstanding 
hourly rate gap found in the “Legal” category, we examined its internal 
distribution.  As Figure 3 shows, the hourly rate distribution of women 
in this category is highly skewed, with the vast majority of profiles 
offering the lower end of the hourly rate scale. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of hourly rate of male and female profiles in the “Legal 
Category.” 
One possible explanation for this huge gap is the fact that, in 
the studied platform, the “Legal” category hosts a variety of tasks and 
skills, from paralegals to attorney-at-law.  Therefore, we further 
examined the ties between gender, years of experience, and the level 
of education in this category.  As Figure 4 shows, the hourly rate gap is 
apparent in all ranges of work experience.  When the hourly rate gap 
between women and men is compared against the level of education 
in the “Legal” category, the findings are even more striking: while at 
the associate degree level the average hourly rate of women is 106% 
that of men, at the undergraduate level there is already a gap of 65% 
in favor of men, and at the graduate level (which includes LL.M., 
M.B.A., etc.) the average hourly rate of women makes only 34% of the 
average hourly rate of men.  At the doctorate level (J.D.) women J.D.’s 
hourly rates are 55% to men’s 100% (see Figure 5).  A regression 
model on the effect of gender, years of experience, the level of 
education on the log of the hourly rate in the legal category confirms 
that the effect of gender remains significant even given other factors 
that explain the variance in the hourly rate (F=31.87, p<0.001, R-
square = 0.28).  See Table 5. 
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Figure 4. Legal category: Average hourly rate by years of experience and gender. 
 
Figure 5. Legal category: Average hourly rate by level of education and gender. 
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Table 5. “Legal” category: Regression model of the effect of gender, 
years of experience and level of education on the log of the hourly rate 
Dependent Variable: log hourly rate 
Number of Observations Read 431
Number of Observations Used 239
Number of Observations with Missing Values 192
 
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of
Squares
Mean
Square
F Value Pr > F 
Model 3 43.34248 14.44749 31.87 <.0001 
Error 235 106.53534 0.45334    
Corrected Total 238 149.87782    
 
Root MSE 0.67331 R-Square 0.2892
Dependent Mean 3.33536 Adj R-Sq 0.2801
Coeff Var 20.18691  
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Parameter Estimates
Variable DF Parameter
Estimate
Standard
Error
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 2.55237 0.20678 12.34 <.0001 
Gender (Female) 1 -0.45163 0.10090 -4.48 <.0001 
Degree 1 0.26824 0.04262 6.29 <.0001 
Experience 1 0.01159 0.00559 2.07 0.0393 
 
C. Discussion of Findings 
Our findings show that, on average, women’s hourly rates are 
significantly lower than men’s when considering the same tasks, 
despite similar levels of educational attainment, feedback score, and 
length of experience. 
Two questions derive from this data.  The first concerns 
women’s undervaluation of themselves.  This could be caused either 
by women’s increased need for money (which may explain why they 
work more on the Platform), or because the online hourly rates are 
operating in the shadow of the offline market in which women often 
earn less than men.  Should women simply post higher hourly rates?  
Literature on women and negotiations has identified a significant 
difference between men and women in their propensity to negotiate 
for wages and an a-priori lowering of salary expectations among women 
to avoid negotiation.64  Recently women have been publically urged to 
“lean-in”65 by demanding higher pay, for example.  However, new 
research suggests that posting higher hourly rates may not always be 
beneficial for women.  This research shows that when women are not 
 
 64  See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WHY WOMEN DON’T ASK: THE 
HIGH COST OF AVOIDING NEGOTIATION—AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE (2007).  
 65  SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013). 
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sure what is expected in negotiations, or when those expectations are 
murky, asking for more money does not always work as well for women 
as it does for men, and may actually hurt women financially.66 
A second question is whether there are actual differences in 
pay.  The answer to this question relates to our dependence on the 
data provided by the Platform’s API.  Since the actual payment 
received by users per hour is not available for extraction from the 
Platform’s API, we are unable to systematically analyze actual payment 
received by users per hour for similar tasks and occupations, compared 
to their hourly rate.  Despite this limitation, it is most likely that gender 
differences in pay remain due to the Platform’s role in shaping the 
interaction between work seekers and work providers: work seekers 
apply to jobs posted by work providers, after which the latter can review 
the applications and contact applicants for interviews, based on their 
profiles which include their hourly rates.67  At this point, some 
negotiation may go on between users and those in need of tasks 
performed, however the negotiation itself is not a structured element 
of the Platform’s interface and may take place using another medium, 
such as email, chat, or telephone.68  There may be some negotiation 
regarding timeframe and expediency, and a move to a fixed rather 
than hourly rate.  Such fixed rate will likely be derivative or connected 
to the posted hourly rate.  While it is a possibility that during 
negotiation men’s hourly rates will go down, and women’s rates will 
increase, thus making the actual pay more equitable, it seems more 
likely that some gender discrepancy remains, especially in categories 
in which the difference in hourly rates is huge, such as the “Legal” 
category (women’s average hourly rate is 63% lower than men’s), or 
large such as “Accounting & Consulting” (women’s average hourly rate 
is 38% lower than men’s), making it increasingly plausible that 
ultimately women are paid less for the same tasks.  The gaps we found 
resonate with findings from studies on the pay gap in the general 
economy, further suggesting that the “gig” economy is not an anomaly 
to this pattern.69 
 
 66  See Christine Exley, Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, New Research: Women Who 
Don’t Negotiate Might Have Good Reason, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 12, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/04/women-who-dont-negotiate-their-salaries-might-have-a-
good-reason; Christine L. Exley, Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, Knowing When to 
Ask: The Cost of Leaning-in (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16–115, 2016), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16-115_a6680006-be03-44be-ab6f-
3625d3f21c00.pdf.  
 67  See supra note 52. 
 68  Id. 
 69  See supra note 26. 
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While our computational approach to measuring differences 
between men and women in the “gig” economy through the data 
provided by the API of the studied platform limits our ability to 
measure actual pay, it allows for large data computation, and an actual 
snapshot of differences in the average hourly rates of men and women 
on the Platform.  Furthermore, it uniquely captures some of the 
marketplace interactions that take place ahead of pay negotiations or 
actual pay in platform-facilitated labor.  While survey data relies on 
answers to questions reported by men and women, our data set 
captures the shaping of new dynamics of self-evaluation and self-
presentation in the “gig” economy.  Through these interactions, our 
findings suggest that we are witnessing the remaking of women into 
devalued laborers. 
PART III. THE INEPTITUDE OF CURRENT LEGAL NORMS 
Advances in technology are powerful tools that have influenced 
both industry and gender relations.70  As online platforms enhance 
widespread changes in labor, the law must adapt to the changing 
workplace.  What can be done to ensure that women realize the 
promises of work in the “sharing” economy? 
Law can provide at least two tools for enhancing gender 
equality in this context.  First, online, platform-based labor should 
become an option that provides sustainable work for those heavily 
involved.  This requires some labor protections like minimum wage, 
pro rata health insurance, and family leave, at least for those working 
a significant number of hours on platforms.  This first tool will be 
discussed briefly in infra Part III.A as others have dealt with the 
question which it implicates: when workers should be considered 
employees.  The second tool, addressed in infra Part III.B, focuses on 
the inability of antidiscrimination law to deal with women’s platform-
labor subordination.  As our case study illustrates, there are dramatic 
gender disparities in hourly rates in platform-facilitated labor.  While 
the case study does not purport to examine all platform-facilitated 
online labor, it should raise serious concerns about women’s equality 
in this context, and about platforms’ potential role in cultivating 
gender equality.  Efforts to mitigate the perils faced disproportionately 
by women might include updating antidiscrimination laws to diminish 
gendered pay gaps or imagining entirely new forms of regulation. 
 
 70  Nancy B. Schess, Then and Now: How Technology Has Changed the Workplace, 30 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 435 (2013).  
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A. Employee Status 
The debate about labor protections directly implicates the 
question of whether taskers are employees or independent 
contractors.  The law’s answer to this question may vary according to 
the amount of control the given platform possesses over its taskers.71  If 
taskers are considered employees of a certain company, they become 
eligible for protective labor laws such as minimum wage and 
overtime.72  Online platforms, however, are fiercely resisting efforts to 
classify taskers as employees.73  Platforms insist that their workers are 
nothing more than independent contractors.74  Uber, for example, 
exerts considerable control over its drivers by setting rates and making 
termination decisions,75 yet considers them independent contractors.76  
For workers on other platforms which do not set laborers’ rates, it 
might be more difficult to argue for employee status.  Yet even for such 
workers, considering all laborers on a given platform as business 
entities and micro-entrepreneurs ignores both the gatekeeping role 
such platforms have undertaken, and the surplus they attain for every 
transaction.  Some have argued that we should view taskers’ 
relationships to platforms as an intermediate status between traditional 
employment and independent contracting (proposing a third status of 
dependent contractors or independent workers).77  This approach 
would afford workers some labor protections, but not all.78 
B. Antidiscrimination 
Employment status is also critical to the second component, 
which focuses on gender in particular.  The protections of 
antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII are triggered only in an 
 
 71  See supra note 19. 
 72  See Sachs, supra note 7; Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital 
Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 578, 581–82 (2016).  See generally 
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 19. 
 73  See supra note 19. 
 74  This is clearly evident from platforms’ terminology of laborers, see supra note 
13, and see also the litigation in O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989 
(N.D. Cal. 2014); and Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13-CV-04065, 2016 WL 1394236 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 11, 2015). 
 75  Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 19, at 1, 11–13, 33–35. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal For Modernizing Labor Laws for 
Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker”, HAMILTON PROJECT (Dec. 2015), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_fi
rst_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf.  
 78  Id. 
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employment relationship.79  Even if workers do eventually win the 
battle over their employment status, antidiscrimination laws may 
require updating for the new, online economy.  Since online labor is 
often performed under gender-blind policies,80 and without face-to-
face interaction, discriminatory treatment may be especially difficult to 
prove. 
If, as some have argued, taskers should be viewed as dependent 
contractors or independent workers,81 antidiscrimination laws would 
apply, but other worker protections like health insurance mandates 
would not.82  Under this scenario, workers in this intermediate category 
would be significantly less protected than if they were deemed 
employees.  Women might not be legally discriminated against, but all 
workers would still lack important supports.  The lack of family leave 
may affect women more significantly than men.83  And, of course, 
intentional discrimination would remain difficult to prove.  Still, an 
intermediate status may be better for workers than the status quo, in 
which workers are currently treated as independent contractors.84  
Certain basic labor protections are not part of this relationship by 
operation of law, such as minimum wage and family leave, or even 
antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII (though some have long 
sought to amend antidiscrimination laws to cover independent 
contractors).85 
Yet even if online taskers are relegated to independent 
contractor status, one could argue that platforms still cannot permit 
discrimination to occur on their platforms.  Scholars have recently 
claimed that some “sharing” economy companies, especially those 
offering services like housing or transportation, are “functional 
substitutes” for traditional public accommodations and therefore that 
federal public accommodation law should be updated to capture racial 
discrimination in the “sharing” economy.86  Sex discrimination, on the 
 
 79  Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (1964) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)). 
 80  The Platform in our case study, for example, does not have a designated field 
for gender on its profile “template” but does have a field for name and photo. 
 81  Harris & Krueger, supra note 77. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Women still perform the lion’s share of family-work.  See Schoenbaum, supra 
note 17, at 3. 
 84  Ross, supra note 33, at 1438–41.  
 85  Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for 
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 
B.C. L. REV 239 (1997). 
 86  Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations, 105 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2687486 
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other hand, can be litigated under state public accommodation 
legislation, such as the Unruh Civil Rights Act in California.87  That Act 
bars sex discrimination by business establishments.88  If, as platforms 
claim, their laborers are business partners/micro-entrepreneurs/
independent contractors, then one could argue that platforms are 
business establishments that must treat clients (here, the taskers) 
without discrimination.89  Following the common law doctrine 
requiring places of public accommodation “to serve all customers on 
reasonable terms without discrimination and . . . to provide the kind 
of product or service reasonably to be expected from their economic 
role,”90 the Unruh Act forbids business establishments from engaging 
in sex discrimination in dealing with their clients.91 
Similar laws can be found in other jurisdictions as well.92  Three 
doctrinal questions arise from this type of law, though: first, are online 
platforms business establishments under the Unruh Act?  While most 
public accommodation doctrine has been interpreted to refer to 
physical accommodation,93 some precedents have extended Unruh’s 
 
(draft from July 23, 2016). 
 87  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51–51.3 (West 2016). 
 88   Id. § 51, 51.5(a). 
 89  See also Noah Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Gig Economy Discrimination Outside 
Employment Law, ON LABOR (Jan. 19, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/01/19/beyond-
misclassification-gig-economy-discrimination-outside-employment-law.  
 90  In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 996 (Cal. 1970). 
 91  The Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code Section 51, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, 
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national 
origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, 
sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status 
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 
whatsoever. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2016).  
 92  See, e.g., Alberta Human Rights Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-25.5 (Can.); Treaty of 
Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. XIII, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 
340); Council Directive 2004/113, 2004 O.J. (L 373) 37 (EC) (implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of 
goods and services); Isabelle Chopin & Eirini-Maria Gounari, Developing Anti-
Discrimination Law in Europe – The 27 EU Member States Compared, EUR. COMMISSION 101 
(Nov. 2009), https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/developing-anti-
discrimination-law-in-europe—-the-27-eu-member-states-compared. 
 93  “Physical accommodation” refers to accommodations such as inns, hotels, 
restaurants, country clubs.  Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public 
Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. 
L.J. 1783, 1785–86 (2012).  See, e.g., Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 115 
P.3d 1212 (Cal. 2005) (regarding country clubs). 
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liability to websites when, for example, they denied access due to sexual 
orientation.94 
Second, are there legitimate business reasons (permissible 
under the statute) to allow taskers to offer their services at substantially 
different prices?  From platforms’ perspective, for example, this might 
generate more diverse profiles.  Third, and most importantly, is the 
Unruh definition of discrimination too narrow?  Under Unruh, cases 
have typically been concerned with assuring equal opportunity of 
access (whether to rental property or entrance to restaurants, country 
clubs, and other businesses).95  But in online labor, gender 
discrimination does not seem to appear in the form of formal barriers 
or overt exclusions:96 both men and women are free to participate as 
online taskers, yet pay inequality seems to occur in platform-facilitated 
labor.  Under the Unruh Act, prohibiting this kind of disparity would 
require an interpretation that ensures not just equal access to 
platforms but prevents substantive discrimination from taking place 
within platforms.  Courts have noted that the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
must be construed liberally.97  Still, some courts have required proof of 
intentional discrimination,98 an extremely difficult burden to satisfy in 
the online context. 
 
 94  See, e.g., Ashleigh Bergeron, Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC: Eradicating Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination in Cyberspace, 17 L. & SEXUALITY 173, 179–80 (2008) 
(examining Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007), 
which declared that a website was a “business establishment” and its policy of allowing 
access only to heterosexual couples was not supported by legitimate business reasons). 
 95  See Alison Rothi, Changing Ideas About Changing Diapers, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 927 
(2004) (discussing the Unruh Act).  
 96  See, e.g., case study discussion supra Part II. 
 97  Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623, 626 (Cal. 2009) (finding that liberal 
construction is necessary to carry out the Act’s purpose to “create and preserve a 
nondiscriminatory environment . . . by ‘banishing’ or ‘eradicating’ arbitrary, invidious 
discrimination by such establishments. . . .  [The] Act ‘serves as a preventive measure, 
without which it is recognized that businesses might fall into discriminatory 
practices’”) (citations omitted).  The court holds that in the context of disability 
discrimination, a plaintiff proceeding under Section 51(f) of the Unruh Act “may 
obtain statutory damages on proof of an ADA access violation without the need to 
demonstrate additionally that the discrimination was intentional.”  Id. at 628.  
 98  See Timothy B. Liebaert, The Death of the Unruh Civil Rights Act: An Examination of 
the Act After Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV and an Argument in Favor of 
Liberalizing the Act, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); Note, The Andiscrimination Principle in 
the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1993 (1989).  See, e.g., Greater L.A. Agency on 
Deafness, Inc., v. Cable News Network, Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 425 (2014) (holding that 
under the Unruh Act, plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination and affirmative 
misconduct on the part of those violating the Act—much more than disparate impact 
of a facially neutral policy); Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 115 P.3d 1212 
(Cal. 2005). 
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Moreover, even if discrimination jurisprudence could be 
interpreted to resolve the doctrinal difficulties noted above, bringing 
claims under antidiscrimination law is not the only possible way, and 
may possibly not even be the best way, to tackle women’s subordinate 
position in online labor.  Indeed, filing such cases may generate 
publicity and have some “educational” effect on the market.  But 
discrimination claims are largely based on private rights of 
enforcement which require that taskers’ legal consciousness be raised99 
and, once raised, that they would be capable and willing to present, 
and possibly litigate, claims.  Since such claims are often filed 
individually, and after the fact, and given the magnitude and scale of 
online labor, their effect may be quite limited. 
PART IV. FROM DISCRIMINATION 3.0 TOWARDS EQUALITY-BY-DESIGN 
A. A Third Generation of Discrimination 
The doctrinal difficulties regarding both federal anti-
discrimination law and state public accommodation law, expose the 
ineptitude of current legal norms to address the devaluation of 
women’s work in today’s on-call, platform-facilitated economy.  Of 
course, we are only beginning to understand the relationship between 
gender and the “gig” economy, and so this Part provides a nascent 
attempt to conceptualize gender inequality in this emerging context.  
In the past, plaintiffs in discrimination suits could point to a specific 
culprit, whether an individual or a policy, and the court would have to 
answer a basic underlying question: “Who did the discriminating?”  In 
the first generation of sex discrimination claims, formal barriers played 
a significant evidentiary role.  In the second generation, the quest was 
to identify underlying sex biases by a manager, company policy, or a 
workplace culture, dynamic, or organizational practice that lead to 
entrenching unequal access, exclusion, glass ceilings or harassment.100 
But in today’s world of platform work, as demonstrated in our 
case study, we are witnessing what may be a third generation of sex 
inequality—Discrimination 3.0.  Our focus and the questions we ask 
must be adapted in two ways.  First, the questions of access and 
inclusion should be supplemented with questions of usability.  Men 
and women generally have equal access to the platform, yet the way 
 
 99  See Amy Blackstone et al., Legal Consciousness and Responses to Sexual Harassment, 
43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (2009). 
 100  See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465–74 (2001).  Others have described the first 
phase of gender discrimination as ending exclusion and the second as transforming 
male centred norms, see Abrams, supra note 28, at 1186. 
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they may be able to benefit from platform-facilitated labor seems to 
vary.  Second, the goal should increasingly shift from aiming to 
determine who is doing the discrimination to answering how the 
discrimination is being effectuated.  Indeed, the how question has been 
suggested by antidiscrimination scholars in other contexts,101 but it is 
increasingly important in the online labor arena, where intentional 
discrimination, and even biases towards an individual tasker, are often 
virtually impossible to prove.  We should therefore increasingly be 
asking how inequality is being (re)produced and in which 
institutionalized ways is discrimination enabled by platforms, and by 
society?  We should steadily be inquiring how discrimination is 
facilitated and harbored by the practices of platform-facilitated on-call 
labor.  But also, consider the structural disadvantages with which 
laborers come to use “gig” economy platforms to begin with.102 
As for platforms, we know that they not only represent social 
interactions, but that the way platforms are structured—their 
architecture, meaning their technological affordances and code—
affects human behavior.103  Platform codes are invisible to most of us, 
yet they operate as de facto law in the online arena.104  The way they 
regulate is a function of their algorithmic design.105 
In our case study, we revealed consistent gender discrepancies 
regarding hourly rates.  But women were not excluded from the 
Platform, which could be considered prohibited intentional 
discrimination, and the Platform may not have even portrayed them in 
a biased or sex-stereotyped manner.  In fact, on its face, its interface is 
gender agnostic, in the sense that it does not structure gender as an 
official field in the user’s profile.  One may argue that the platform 
 
 101  Sturm, supra note 100, at 460–61.  See also Martha Albertson Fineman, The 
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 
(2008) (arguing that we should move from focusing on individual discrimination 
focused on identity and look at the ways social institutions distribute power and 
resources). 
 102  For example, structural disadvantages include gendered pay gaps in the offline 
labor market and lack of paid family leave.  See supra note 26; see also Maxine Eichner, 
Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 
148–50 (claiming that U.S. parental leave policy fails to protect a sufficient concept of 
parenting); Laura T. Kessler, Keeping Discrimination Theory Front and Center in the 
Discourse over Work and Family Conflict, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 313, 314 (2007) (explaining 
connections between gender bias and work/family conflict). 
 103  LAWRENCE LESSING, CODE VERSION 2.0 5–6, 24, 34 (2006); see also Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through 
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 505–06 (1999). 
 104  LESSING, supra note 103, at 58. 
 105  Id. 
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solely reflects age-old social dynamics.  Yet the codes of a platform may 
nonetheless condition some of the social interactions it hosts.106  
Contemplating the ties between platforms’ policies, their 
technological affordances and user behavior, along with opportunities 
in play outside of the platform in the market and in the family, may 
explain some of the discriminatory effect we observed.107  These 
interactions, taken together with women’s structural disadvantages in 
the labor market and the family more generally suggest that platform-
facilitated labor should be viewed cautiously as a liberating, equality-
enhancing work option for women. 
B. Towards A Platform for Equality? 
The aim of this last subsection is to briefly sketch a possible 
direction for enhancing equality in platform-facilitated labor in the 
future.  If “sharing” economy companies are made aware of the 
discrimination taking place on their platforms, they may be inclined to 
consider ways to offset inequality.  Changes within a platform’s design 
may prove necessary to prevent today’s forms of sex discrimination at 
work, and regulating platforms through law and technology may 
advance women’s economic equality in online workplaces.  Yet, it may 
not be quite as straightforward as merely embedding the value of 
equality into a technology and then expecting it to create a direct 
positive effect on society.108  There may well be unintended 
consequences to this move or indeterminate ramifications which we 
 
 106  On the role of the technological affordances of social media platforms in 
shaping discrimination, see Anat Ben-David & Ariadna Matamoros Fernandez, Hate 
Speech and Covert Discrimination on Social Media: Monitoring the Facebook Pages of Extreme-
Right Political Parties in Spain, 10 INT’L J. OF COMM. 1 (2016). 
 107  When further thinking about how discrimination may be facilitated through 
platforms regarding the mediation of the work related social interactions and the 
hourly rate gap, we should be thinking about platforms’ existing features and 
affordances, but also consider those features that are absent from the interface.  
Consider the following two examples.  First, the negotiation process mentioned above.  
In most cases, the negotiation on the terms of actual pay that incorporates a social 
interaction between the work-seeker and the work-provider takes place outside of the 
Platform.  Such practice of posting hourly rates that are pending negotiation, along 
with the distancing of the negotiations from the Platform, may contribute to the 
preservation of age-old gender dynamics in the labor market.  Second, the Platform’s 
design to conduct feedback scores without substantive guidelines may also cause those 
more in need of such work to a-priori lower rates to receive a better feedback score. 
 108  Mary Flanagan, Daniel C. Howe & Helen Nissenbaum, Embodying Values in 
Technology: Theory and Practice, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
322–23 (Jeroen van den Hoven & John Weckert eds., 2008).  See also Helen 
Nissenbaum, From Preemption to Circumvention: If Technology Regulates, Why Do We Need 
Regulation (and Vice Versa)?, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1370 (2011) (“[I]f we have 
technology, why do we need law?”).  
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cannot anticipate.  However, given that technology is already 
functioning as regulation, those who care about gender equality must 
consider ways to support the de-facilitation of platform inequality.  
Since platforms have the best access to large-scale information about 
their workers’ hourly rates and pay, as well as control over 
membership, shaping of profile categories, feedback scores, and 
whether to allow for negotiations, platforms themselves could best be 
suited to enact pre-emptive measures through their affordances and 
codes to de-facilitate and counteract discrimination.109  “Sharing” 
economy companies could promote within their architecture an 
“Equality-by-Design” (EbD): the structuring of platforms in a manner 
that is sensitive to prevailing forms of gender discrimination, in ways 
that extend beyond merely omitting gender as a formal element of 
platforms’ template for profiles or not portraying women in a biased 
manner. 
This goal of EbD could be affected through measures platform 
designers, researchers and policy makers should start to imagine, 
contemplate and discuss.  These could include, for example, having 
platforms inform the market of average hourly rates by providing 
notices of average hourly rates for certain tasks to taskers, or publishing 
reasonable hourly rates, or suggesting hourly rates to users.  Platforms 
may also reflect on the ways profiles are displayed and how the 
application system might enable discrimination, or on providing 
transparent guidelines for assessing users’ performance and, 
importantly, on whether negotiations should be structured or 
narrowed.  Such changes, if put in place, could be quite easily 
monitored by platforms’ technologies, and verified and evaluated for 
their equality-enhancing capacities.110 
In fact, such mechanisms and reflections could be self-imposed 
and self-regulated by platforms.111  It is fair to assume that companies 
 
 109  See Katharine T. Bartlett & G. Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Costumers (Duke L. 
Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Series, No. 2015-4, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540334.  With regard to sexual harassment law, see Mary 
Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012). 
 110  See Flanagan, Howe & Nissenbaum, supra note 108, at 344.  For the dangers 
associated with algorithmic regulation, see, for example, Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-
Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Transparency in Algorithmic Enforcement, FLA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741513. 
 111  Some sharing economy companies have begun to prohibit posting materials 
that bans users based on sexual orientation.  Nick Duffy, Accommodation website Airbnb 
removes listing that banned gay couples, PINKNEWS (Nov. 23, 2014, 11:52 AM), 
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2014/11/23/accomodation-website-airbnb-removes-
listing-that-banned-gay-couples.  For an example of effective self-regulation in the 
general economy, see Sturm, supra note 100, at 509–19. 
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aiming to attract women laborers would be well advised to consider 
such mechanisms.  However, imposition of legal liability might 
ultimately be necessary to initiate some of these reforms. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article aims to ignite a conversation about equality in the 
“sharing” or “gig” economy.  It draws attention to the gender inequality 
taking hold within digital platforms.  It empirically shows that gender 
inequality is re-configured and reproduced through platform-
facilitated labor, casting doubt on the liberating and equality-
enhancing promise platform-facilitated labor carries for women.  
Looking ahead towards the legal and policy choices that are likely to 
take place in the near future regarding labor in the “sharing” 
economy, the realization that gender inequality is reproduced on 
platforms must force us to begin to contemplate legal, social and 
technological mechanisms to mitigate this phenomenon. 
 
